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CROSSING THE BORDER THROUGH
IMMIGRATION, IMPORTATION, ILLICIT AND
OTHER MEANS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS
ANNA WILLIAMS SHAVERS*
Introduction
It's that fundamental belief-I am my brother's keeper, I am my sisters'
keeper-that makes this country work. It's what allows us to pursue our in-
dividual dreams, yet still come together as a single American family. "E
pluribus unum." Out of many, one.lAmerica is enriched by diversity. It is
preserved by unity.
This symposium, "Border Patrols: The Legal, Racial, Social and Eco-
nomic Implications of United States Immigration Policy," provides an op-
portunity for us to explore the use of borders as a means of excluding peo-
ple in the United States from the full enjoyment of rights. These borders
can be physical borders of the country, but they can also be borders or bar-
riers to entry into the enjoyment of rights even after physical entry into the
country. These barriers may be constructed by laws that define and limit
the enjoyment of rights based upon classifications of status assigned to in-
dividuals because of their race, gender, or method of entry across the phys-
ical barriers, or these classifications may have their origin in societal treat-
ments that are tolerated although not embodied in law. These assigned
labels become identities for each of us coupled with ones that we have cho-
sen for ourselves. 3 "The citizen's point of reference is the political commu-
* Cline Williams Professor of Citizenship Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. This article is
based on remarks delivered at the St. John's Symposium, "Border Patrols: The Legal, Racial, Social and
Economic Implications of United States Immigration Policy" on March 16. 2012. The article was sup-
ported by a Ross McCollum research grant from the University of Nebraska College of Law and the
helpful assistance and editing of the symposium organizers and editors of the St. John's Journal of Civil
Rights and Economic Development.
I Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the Democratic National Convention (July 27, 2004), availa-
ble a: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2004/demconvention/speeches/obama.html.
2 The Bradley Project on America's Nat'l Identity, E PLURIBUS UNuM 5 (2008).
3 JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTuAL EXPLORATION
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nity, but as a man he has other memberships .. .4 The assigned label and
status often prevents the enjoyment of rights and participation that we ex-
pect.
E Pluribus Unum, quoted above from President Obama's 2004 keynote
address, 5 was the national de facto motto of the United States until it was
replaced by a formal motto in 1956 by an act of Congress adopting "In God
We Trust."6 E Pluribus Unum remains on the Great Seal of the United
States. Even though its origin was focused more on the fact that the federal
nature of the union signified a formation of one country out of many
states,7 many view "E Pluribus Unum" as the lasting legacy of the country,
viewing its meaning of "out of many, one" or "one from many" as the em-
bodiment of the idea that the United States is a nation of immigrants.8 Alt-
hough some have made the use of the phrase controversial, 9 Presidents and
courts, among others, continue to emphasize the importance of this princi-
ple, even though some attempt to minimize its importance.10 As President
Clinton said in his inaugural address, the idea of "America" is "that our na-
OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS 15 (2000) ("people sometimes experience their identities as given,
sometimes as chosen, and sometimes as a combination of the two..."),
4 MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 194 (Si-
mon & Schuster 1982) [hereinafter OBLIGATIONS].
5 Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the Democratic National Convention, supra note 1.
6 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
7 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 14 (1824) (arguments of counsel); see generally Robert Em-
mett Bums, The Death ofE Pluribus Unum, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 653 (1970).
8 The Continental Congress passed a resolution on July 4, 1776, authorizing a committee to devise
a seal for the United States of America. The seal was adopted by Congress June 20, 1782. See
BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GREAT SEAL OF THE UNITED
STATES (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135450.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Nick Wing, Michele Bachmann & Allies: Obama Doesn't Say 'God' Enough,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2013, 2:15 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/08/michele-bachmann-congressional-prayer-
caucus n_793147.html; Dave Niose, "E Pluribus Unum " becomes controversial, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
(Mar. 13, 2011), available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/our-humanity-naturally/201103/e-
pluribus-unum-becomes-controversial (noting that the Congressional Prayer Caucus wrote a letter to
President Barack Obama, chastising him for referring to the motto E Pluribus Unum). See Letter from
Congressional Prayer Caucus to President Barack Obama (Dec. 6, 2010) (on file at
http://forbes.house.gov/uploadedfiles/national-motto letter-to_president.pdf)
10 Recent Presidents have often referred to "E Pluribus Unum" as the nation's motto. See, e.g.,
Proclamation No. 7526, 3 C.F.R. 7526 (2002); Proclamation No. 7500, 3 C.F.R. 7500 (2001); President
Reagan, Remarks at the National Forum on Excellence in Education in Indianapolis, Indiana (December
8, 1983) (transcript available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/120883b.htm).
See also infra note II (President Clinton). Members of Presidents' Cabinets have also used the motto.
See, e.g., History Reminds Us What It Is To Be American (NAT'L HIST. CLUB, Boston, Mass.), Fall
2007, at I (featuring Senator Lamar Alexander, Secretary of Education under George H.W. Bush, stat-
ing that "[olur greatest accomplishment is that we have found a way to assimilate so many disparate
peoples into one united country. E pluribus unum: out of many, one. That is our unique history and
what makes us truly exceptional"). Senator Lamar Alexander currently represents Tennessee in the
Senate. See also Thomas Sowell, Cultural Diversity: A World View, Speech at the 1990 Francis Boyer
Lecture AEI Annual Dinner (December 5, 1990) (transcript available at
http://www.tsowell.com/spcultur.html) ("The very motto of the country-E Pluribus Unum-
recognizes the diversity of the American people").
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tion can summon from its myriad diversity the deepest measure of unity."'"
One judge acknowledged the principle in this way: "E Pluribus Unum-
from many, one. It was a good idea when the country was founded, and it's
a good idea today. From many, one. That still identifies us.' 2 This concept
helps us visualize a nation where its citizens are people from many differ-
ent backgrounds, races, religions, and nationalities that come together as a
united nation where equal rights are accorded to all its citizens. A person's
skin color or nation of origin would have no bearing on their exercise of
rights. The notion of a cohesive nation is possible because of a legal struc-
ture that establishes individual rights and obligations and the limits of gov-
ernment power. If the shared rights and obligations derived from citizen-
ship outweigh the differences imposed by racial, ethnic and culture
backgrounds the result is the formation of a political community.' 3 The ac-
quisition of citizenship has come to be accepted as a prerequisite for mem-
bership in the American political community.'
4
The national sense of this belief has been challenged in many ways since
the beginning of the nation; this challenege continues today. There is not
always agreement on how to reconcile the "many" and the "one." People
sometimes differ on the meaning of the phrase and whether Pluribus or
Unum should be emphasized. Michael Walzer has described the American
use of this phrase as symbolizing "a coexistence-... many-in-one."' 5 This
coexistence, he believes, leads to American Pluralism evidenced by the
"manyness of America [being] cultural [and] its oneness [being] politi-
cal."'16 Unlike many other nations, America is a political society formed by
people who come together but "are free to retain" the identity they had be-
fore becoming Americans.1
7
In this article, I explore some of the many ways in which divisions have
existed and resulted in a lack of extension of equal rights to all within the
"1 William J. Clinton, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1993) (transcript available at
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detailU3434).
12 Jeffers v. Tucker, 839 F.Supp. 612, 634 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (quoting MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM &
EDMUND BEARD, THE RE-SEGREGATION OF AMERICA: THE RACIAL POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE
REDISTRICTING 22-23 (1993)).
13 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165
(1874).
14 1 recognize that as Michael Walzer has stated, "There is no country called America. We live in
the United States of America, and we have appropriated the adjective "American" even though we can
claim no exclusive title to it." Michael Walzer, What Does It Mean to Be an "American "?, 71 SOC.
RES. 633 (2004). This book was originally published in 57 Soc. RES. (Fall 1990). I choose to use the
term here recognizing as does Walzer that in North America, "Canadians and Mexicans are also Ameri-
cans, but they have adjectives more obviously their own, and we have none." Id. at 633.
15 Michael Walzer, What Does It Mean to Be an "American"?, 71 SOC. RES. 633, 636 (2004)
[hereinafter "American"] (discussing the essence of Americanism).
16 Id. at 638.
17 Id. at 636.
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borders of the United States. I also question whether it is valid to distin-
guish among people in the United States when deciding what rights should
be extended. The three questions that I have phrased elsewhere as (1) who
is a citizen, (2) what are the rights of citizens, and (3) how one becomes a
citizen of the United States, 18 must also be considered with a fourth ques-
tion: Should the extension of rights be based upon the acquisition of citi-
zenship? My goal here is not to provide a definite answer to these ques-
tions, nor is it to provide an exhaustive review of the exclusionary practices
related to citizenship, but rather to explore and encourage: Explore our his-
tory, our existing laws, and the current debate on the extension of rights,
and encourage others to join the debate.
In Part I, I explore what I view as the main basis for assessing these
issues, the status of citizenship. An exploration of citizenship requires an
inquiry into the methods for acquiring citizenship, the exclusion from the
eligibility to acquire citizenship and the rights that we expect to be extend-
ed to citizens. Conceptualizing citizenship requires a reflection on the civil
and political participation as well as the social rights and entitlements that
are perceived to be incident to citizenship, but have not been extended to
all citizens. I examine the history of denial or revocation of rights for cer-
tain citizens in Part II. This denial includes individuals that have been clas-
sified as citizens yet excluded from the enjoyment of rights that should be
expected to be enjoyed by all citizens. Often this denial can be traced to the
method of entry of the individual or the individual's family or ancestors
and/or the lingering effect of the assigned status.
In Part III of the article, I examine the presence of non-citizens with-
in the borders of the United States and the denial or extension of rights. Re-
cently, this issue has been hotly debated. Should non-citizens be allowed to
vote, attend public schools, receive public benefits, receive due process in
our legal system, or have a right to be with members of their family? My
brief consideration of these issues here in Parts I though III is informed by
the writings of a number of scholars. I am indebted to them and recom-
mend some of their books to you for a more robust exploration of some of
these issues.19 In the final section of the article, Part IV, I attempt to resolve
18 Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of Developing Citizenship Law and the Nebraska Influence:
A Centennial Essay, 70 NEB. L. REV. 462, 466 (1991).
19 See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1992); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICANS NEED TO RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007); MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT
BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOL CHILDREN (2012); LINDA
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
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some of these issues by applying international law principles in the deter-
mination of rights that should be granted to persons in the country. I con-
clude that it is valuable to maintain a distinction between citizens and
noncitizens but that international treaties or principles of customary law
can help us reach a solution to some of the rights issues presented here.
Citizenship
"Citizens may be marked out by birth or residence or even consent."
20
Globalization, the ease of movement between countries and the accom-
panying immigration issues, has caused many scholars to reflect on citizen-
ship and search for a definition. These reflections include both an explora-
tion of the various means of acquiring citizenship as well as an examination
of the rights that accompany, or should accompany the acquisition of citi-
zenship.
Acquisition of Citizenship
The acquisition of citizenship is generally viewed as "the most desired or
preferred legal status [an individual] can attain...,,21 The laws of the coun-
try in which an individual claims citizenship or nationality determines if the
claim is valid.22 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[I]t is the inherent right
of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its
own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its
citizenship.,
23
There are two basic forms of citizenship: birthright and naturalized. In
the first, a person becomes a citizen of a particular country at birth; gener-
ally, it is automatic and dependent on the operative legal rules. In the se-
cond, a person becomes a citizen of a particular country by voluntary
choice. Birthright citizenship can be determined by the doctrines of jus soli
and jus sanguinis. Jus soli, citizenship by soil, is a doctrine that confers cit-
izenship to a person based on the place of birth. Jus sanguinis, citizenship
by blood or descent, confers citizenship based upon the citizenship of the
person's parents at the time of birth.
Although the Constitution in its original form referred to "citizens" in
UNITED STATES (2006); and EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A CLASSICAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE (2010).
20 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 206.
21 EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND
CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE 4 (2010).
22 See generally Shavers, supra note 18, at 467-68.
23 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898).
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numerous provisions 24 it did not define citizenship. The Constitution did
grant the Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
,,25thsation.' Pursuant to this authority, the early acts of Congress set residency
requirements for naturalization of citizens. 26 The Constitution defined nei-
ther naturalization nor citizenship until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment on July 28, 1868. The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. 27 The ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment included the doctrine ofjus soli in the Constitution. The
jus sanguinis doctrine is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, but
has been adopted in the United States through a series of congressional ac-
tions. The principal application of this doctrine has been to children born
outside of the United States to United States citizens. In most instances the-
se doctrines are not in conflict. However, questions arise when a birth oc-
curs and the parent(s) are not in the country of their own citizenship. If a
citizen of another country gives birth while physically in the United States
and the country of the parent(s) citizenship has adopted jus sanguinis citi-
zenship, the child may have acquired dual citizenship-jus soli United
States citizenship and jus sanguinis citizenship in the country of the par-
ent(s) citizenship.2 8 Some countries have rejected jus soli citizenship.29
The adoption of both jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship in the U.S.
creates complex citizenship law. Some persons are determined to be citi-
zens based upon their birth in the U.S. or to U.S. citizens. Others have be-
come citizens through a naturalization process provided for in a statute or
treaty, and a third group are citizens based upon statutes or treaties that
24 Citizens are referred to in the Constitution in general terms in, among others, these various sec-
tions: U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(qualifications for Senators); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (qualifications for President); U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. I (privileges and immunities of citizens); and U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § 2, cl. I (judicial
power regarding citizens of states).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
26 See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: 1798-1965
11(1981).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 Triple citizenhship may occur in some cases. See note 56 infa and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., British Nationality Act of 1981 (effective January 1, 1983) (creating a limitedjus soli
principle). Only a child born in the UK to a parent who is a British citizen or 'settled' in the UK is au-
tomatically a British citizen by birth. British Nationality Act of 1981, § l(a)(b) (1981); See generally If
You Were Born in the UK or a Qualifying Territory, HOME OFFICE UK BORDER AGENCY,
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/othemationality/Britishcitizenship/borninukorqu
alifyingterritory/; Other modern revisions have recognized jus soli on a limited basis. See generally
Kay Hailbronner, Germany, 2 ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF NATIONALITY: COUNTRY ANALYSES 216
(Rainer Baub6ck et al. eds., 2006); Dual Nationality, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO
GERMANY, http://germany.usembassy.gov/acs/dual-nationality/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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have conferred citizenship status. These groups may be roughly categorized
as constitutional (Fourteenth Amendment) citizens, naturalized citizens 30
and statutory citizens, 3 1 respectively. Most citizens acquire citizenship at
birth, either as statutory or constitutional citizens.
Present law provides that all persons born in the United States become
citizens of the United States at birth unless, as provided in the Fourteenth
Amendment, they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."32 This clause
has been held to exclude Indians and children of either "enemies in hostile
occupation" or foreign diplomats. 33 Congress has expanded the birthright
citizenship category to include Indians, 34 children born abroad to a U.S. cit-
izen,35certain children born in United States possessions, 36 and children of
unknown parentage found in the United States under the age of five. 37 A
person may become a naturalized citizen based upon their intent and a for-
mal application, or collectively. Collective naturalization generally results
from annexation of new territories, admission to statehood, territorial ces-
sion by treaty, or statutory enactment. All persons within a specified group
and meeting certain qualifications become citizens upon the occurrence of
one of these triggering events.38 In some situations, the individuals that are
subject to this collective naturalization are not granted the right of full citi-
30 The term "constitutional citizens" can be used to describe both citizenship acquired at birth
when born in the United States, "subject to its jurisdiction," as well as naturalized citizens since they are
also referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment. Naturalization is defined as the conferring of nationality
after birth by any means. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101(a)(23) (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(23) (2012).
31 "Statutory citizens" is a term used to describe citizens who do not acquire citizenship through
birth in the United States or a naturalization process. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 126 (Yale Univ. Press
1985).
32 Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(a) (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012).
33 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682 (exclusion of children born to foreign enemies or diplomats
based upon law of England and the English colonies as exceptions to thejus soli principle). While rec-
ognizing that the terms "Indian", "American Indian", and "Native American" may not be the preferred
term for some readers, I am using "Indian" as the generally recognized term with no intention of being
offensive.
34 Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (b) (2012).
35 Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(c), (d), (e), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (d), (e), (g).
36 Most residents of United States possessions are nationals but not citizens of the U.S. Id. § 308, 8
U.S.C. § 1408.
Persons who are nationals but not citizens are considered to owe allegiance to the U.S. but do not have
all the rights and obligations that accrue to citizens. This group of "nationals" includes those born in
Puerto Rico (§ 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402), Canal Zone or Republic of Panama (§ 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1403),
Virgin Islands (§ 306, 8 U.S.C. § 1406), Guam (§ 307, 8 U.S.C. § 1407), and those of unknown parent-
age (8 U.S.C. § 1401(f)) (2012).
37 Immigration and Naturalization Act § 301(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f) (2012).
38 See e.g., Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892) ("Congress having the
power to deal with the people of the Territories in view of the future States to be formed from them,
there can be no doubt that in the admission of a State a collective naturalization may be effected in ac-
cordance with the intention of Congress and the people applying for admission.").
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Citizenship and nationality law is integrally related with immigration
policy. The development of immigration policies includes the necessity to
develop a compatible policy for the determination of which individuals
should be granted or denied citizenship. However, immigration policies are
not dependent upon policies on the acquisition of citizenship policies.
While many immigrants do view citizenship as the ultimate achievement in
the immigration process, others do not come to the U.S. seeking immediate
citizenship. However, the period of time that a person waits to file an appli-
cation to become a citizen in the U.S. after becoming eligible has been de-
creasing over the last two decades. Persons naturalizing now wait about six
years after achieving legal permanent resident status.40
Policies regarding the acquisition and retention of citizenship presents a
number of questions, such as: (1) Should all persons born in the United
States acquire citizenship at the time of their birth?41 (2) Should the acts of
parents affect their children's right to acquire or retain citizenship? (3) Un-
der what circumstances should certain groups become citizens, not as indi-
viduals, but based upon their membership in a group?42 and (4) Should we
embrace the concept of dual nationality?43 If these questions are answered,
the issue of accompanying rights remains and presents further questions,
such as: (1) Is citizenship important? (2) Are there certain privileges or
rights that can only be granted to citizens? 44 and (3) Are there situations
when distinctions should be made between birthright citizens and natural-
ized citizens? 4 5
Even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the fashioning of
39 See infra notes 156-166 and accompanying text.
40 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. NATURALIZATIONS: 2011, Dep't of Homeland
Security, Table 7 at 4 (2011), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/natz-fr2011.pdf (median of six year); 1989
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE at xxxix (1990) (me-
dian of eight years).
41 See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 31 (questioning fourteenth amendment acquisition
of citizenship at birth by children of illegal aliens and non-immigrants, i.e., temporary visitors).
42 The principle of collective naturalization is invoked by this question. See infra notes 156-166
and accompanying text.
43 One alternative is to recognize the concept of dual nationality only for minors. Upon reaching
the age of majority, the individual must affirmatively select to retain their American citizenship. See,
e.g., generally Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 832-33 (1971).
44 This question is presented for consideration in many law school immigration texts in connection
with the presence of large numbers of permanent residents who never become citizens and have been
accorded the protections of the Constitution. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, PROCESS AND POLICY 1315 (Westlaw Academic Publishing, 7"' ed.
2011). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMM. 9.
45 For some purposes, birthright citizens are characterized as natural-born or non-natural-born. See
infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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a coherent citizenship law has also presented challenges because of issues
arising from policies relating to the citizenry that is not a part of the immi-
grant population-former slaves, Indians, and inhabitants of territories ac-
quired by the United States. The acquisition of citizenship and its rights
were denied to these groups as well as certain immigrants and women. Alt-
hough the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1878 negated the re-
sult in the 1856 Dred Scott decision,4 6 which had declared that a free man
of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold
as slaves, is neither a "citizen" nor a person within the meaning of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Racial restrictions continued on the acquisi-
tion of citizenship.
In 1884, the Supreme Court held in Elk v. Wilkins that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend birth-right citizenship to every person born in
the United States.47 The Court relied upon the fact that subsequent to the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment there were Indian citizens who
had acquired their citizenship pursuant to treaties or statutes that provided
for certain tribes to acquire citizenship. The Court concluded that citizen-
ship was not already available to Indians under the Constitution because the
Fourteenth Amendment required that all necessary conditions for birthright
citizenship be met at the time of birth. At the time of birth a person had to
be "subject to the jurisdiction."48 Since Indians were not taxed, the Court
asserted, they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Thus, Indians could only become citizens through naturalization-
individual or collective. The Court concluded that John Elk was not a citi-
zen and therefore could not vote. 49 It was not until 1924 that Congress
passed an Act conferring United States citizenship on all Indians born with-
in the territorial limits of the United States.50 The restrictive interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's exclusion clause was not generally applied
to immigrants. 51 In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,52 the Supreme Court
held that a Chinese person born in the United States was a citizen even if
his parents were alien residents who because of their race could not become
naturalized citizens. It was not until 1943 that Chinese became eligible for
46 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) [Dred Scott]
47 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
48 See id. at 100. The rationale was that since Congress had conferred citizenship by statute or trea-
ty, it could be assumed.
49 The majority found no clear intent by Congress to apply either the Fourteenth Amendment or the
1866 Civil Rights Act to Indian citizenship questions. Id at 103
50 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
51 For a summary of the various positions taken in opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and its
presumed purposes and intentions, see generally WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1998).
52 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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naturalization.53
Rethinking The Acquisition of Citizenship
The U.S. has always had a presence of foreign-born or newcomers, but
in the past two decades there has been a steady increase in scholarly work
which focuses on the exclusion of some newcomers from rights thought to
accompany citizenship. Some argue for changes in the methods for acquisi-
tion of citizenship as well as a reconsideration of whether citizenship itself
should be redefined. Some scholars not only question the basis for mem-
bership but also the values attached to the formal acquisition of citizenship.
This citizenship discourse starts with the most basic question-Does citi-
zenship matter?
Our understanding of citizenship and political legitimacy is informed by
the culture of the nation and the identities of those that reside here.54 As
identities change, the culture of the nation, the meaning of citizenship and
the rights we expect to accompany citizenship55 may also change. For ex-
ample, as globalization facilitates the movement of people, we are more
likely to have individuals who have dual or even triple claims to citizenship
in various sovereign states, making membership in one nation less mean-
ingful than envisioned in the past.56 On the other hand, as evidenced by the
reduction in the time period that immigrants who are eligible to naturalize
wait before naturalization, 57 the acquisition of citizenship seems more de-
sirable to immigrants. Another explanation is that this increase is due in
part to the toughening of immigration laws that put even lawful permanent
residents at risk of deportation. 58 But it can also be interpreted as a desire to
be full participants in the American political and social community. Some
residents can even naturalize while maintaining the rights of full participa-
tion in their county of original nationality since some countries have made
it easy for naturalized citizens to maintain their original nationality. 59
Citizenship changes may manifest themselves either in the way we ac-
quire citizenship60 or in a reduction on the value placed upon the acquisi-
53 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, was repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch.
344, 57 Stat. 600, making Chinese eligible for naturalization.
54 See generally Carens, supra note 3 at chapter 7.
55 See infra, Part II.
56 See generally PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER
GLOBALIZATION (2008).
57 See supra discussion accompanying note 41.
58 See infra discussion accompanying notes 171-175.
59 See, e.g., Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Articulo
34, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 20 de Marzo de 1997 (Mex.).
60 See generally Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 28 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 493, 500
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tion of citizenship status. In recent years, scholars have devoted significant
attention to the principles on which citizenship and its accompanying rights
are based. Their work includes attempts to articulate and critique the "prin-
ciples of incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers in-
to existing policies." 61 This work includes assessments of a new and signif-
icant debate that has developed on one of the defining issues of U.S.
citizenship, the meaning and usefulness of birthright citizenship to deter-
mine who acquires citizenship and the accompanying rights.
On one side of the debate, commentators have taken an exclusionary
view of the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and have ad-
vocated for an interpretation that restricts the acquisition of citizenship at
birth based upon birth in the U.S. to children born to parents who owe an
allegiance to the U.S.62 This would exclude children born to people who
are here just temporarily, whether legally or illegally, as well as people
who may intend to stay here permanently but were not legally admitted or
who have overstayed their temporary admission. Their argument is that
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof' should not be interpreted broadly to in-
clude anyone who must comply with our laws while here, but be limited to
those "owing allegiance to our country; being part of our body politic and
our system of government." 63 It is further argued that this view is con-
sistent with the 1866 Civil Rights Act which excluded from automatic citi-
zenship children whose parents' owed allegiance to a foreign power and
was codified as the citizenship clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. 64
These arguments have manifested themselves in the introduction of con-
gressional bills and even calls for a constitutional convention to amend the
Constitution. 65 Often cited as support for this limiting view of birthright
(2007) (discussing how the "good moral character" prerequisite for naturalization reflects the culture of
the nation).
61 Seyla Benhabib, Transformations of Citizenship: The Case of Contemporary Europe, 37 GOV'T
& OPPOSITION 439, 444 (2007) (discussing political membership in liberal democracies as domestic
and international theories of justice).
62 See supra discussion accompanying notes 21-40.
63 John Eastman, The Challenge Facing America: Birthright Citizenship (transcript of John East-
man video presentation on birthright citizenship available at http://www.capsweb.org/about/our-tv-
ads/challenge-facing-america-birthright-citizenship).
64 See John Feere, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: A Global Comparison,
BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2010, at 7-9, available at
http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/20 l 0/birthright.pdf.Birthright Citizenship Roundtable, 33
Admin. & Reg. L. News 3 (2007); Born in the US.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of
9/11: Oversight Hearing on Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 7-8 (2005) (citing Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2892-97 (May 30, 1866)),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=905570 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.905570 (testimony
of John C. Eastman, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, Director, the Claremont
Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence).
65 See generally Feere, supra note 64 at 4-5.
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citizenship is the work of Professors Peter Schuck and Roger Smith in their
book Citizenship Without Consent6 6 which articulates a consensual theory
of citizenship which requires both consent of the individual and the state.
On the other side of the debate are those who take an inclusive view of
citizenship. This group includes not just those who argue for the status quo
of the acquisition of citizenship at birth, but also those who argue that in
part because our system of birthright citizenship results in the exclusion
from full participation in the political and social spheres of some residents
is antiquated and we should embrace residency rather than birthright as the
primary basis for citizenship and its accompanying rights.67 This view
might be described as manifesting a "desire to formulate a more morally
and politically robust conception of citizenship." 68 Contemporary scholars
have argued that traditional methods of viewing citizenship status and the
political community are outmoded.69 One such commentator, in his argu-
ment for including noncitizens within the full circle of membership, asserts:
[I]t is never explained why citizenship is the appropriate category for the
development of a communitarian ethos. Why shouldn't we seek the for-
mation of a sense of reciprocal obligations among all persons living and
working within the territory of the United States? We know, as an empiri-
cal matter, that strong bonds between citizens and resident aliens exist.
These ties, based on familial relationship, ethnicity, religion, race or loca-
tion may be far more powerful than those that can be fostered among citi-
zens who share nothing but American nationality." 70
Linda Bosniak has developed the concept of "citizenship of aliens." 71
She embraces this terminology while recognizing that "the notion of alien
citizenship will be viewed by purists as linguistically nonsensical as well as
provocative." 72 As she states, her interests in immigration and the subordi-
nation of noncitizens drove her exploration of the acquisition of citizenship
66 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 31, at 5 (questioning Fourteenth Amendment acquisition of citi-
zenship at birth by children of illegal aliens and non-immigrants, i.e., temporary visitors). See generally
Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A "'Legislative History", 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331 (2011).
67 See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, Op-Ed., Citizenship to Go, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2012, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/opinion/citizenship-to-go.html; James C. Ho, Birth-
right Citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Texas Legislature, 12 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 161,
163-64 (2007).
68 William Lucy, Equality Under and Before the Law, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 411, 448 (2011).
69 See, e.g., Alexandra Dobrowolsky, (In)Security and Citizenship: Security, Immigration and
Shrinking Citizenship Regimes, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 629 (2007). Some scholars have
narrowed the concept of citizenship to focus on particular rights that should be granted to noncitizens.
See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 505-07, 511
(2007). See also Carens, supra note 3, at 161-62 (arguing that citizenship has multiple dimensions: the
legal, the political, and the psychological dimensions of citizenship.).
70 Aleinikoff, Citizens, supra note 44, at 30-31.
71 See BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 2.
72 Id. at 12.
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and citizenship rights:
I wondered, in particular, about the meaning of this discourse for those
people living within liberal democratic societies who lack citizenship by
legal definition. If citizenship is treated as the highest measure of social and
political inclusion, can people designated as noncitizens as a matter of sta-
tus be among the universe of the included? On first reflection, the answer is
obviously no: common sense tells us that citizenship is-of course-only
for citizens. Further reflection, though, greatly complicates the answer. 73
She asserts that there is a need for citizenship theorists to consider the ef-
fects of globalization and not "disregard ... the larger world frame and...
permeability of national borders." 74 This must be accomplished notwith-
standing the traditional model of "bounded solidarity" which assigns a
more protected and inclusive status to insiders than extended to even resi-
dent non-national others. Roger Smith describes this task as "devising more
desirable forms of (less sharply) bounded solidarities." 75 Building upon her
earlier work where she urged that any consideration of the concept of citi-
zenship requires an exploration of citizenship in four distinct discourses:
citizenship as formal legal status (which differentiates the citizen from the
alien), citizenship as rights, citizenship as political activity, and citizenship
as identity/solidarity," 76 she does not solve the complex puzzle for us, but
as she concedes that noncitizens an only "aspire to partial citizenship at
best,"7 7 she provides a framework and makes a good case for reconsider-
ing the "outsider status' of alienage in deciding whether disabilities as-
signed to that status are appropriate.78
Jacqueline Stevens concludes that much of the recent controversy over
birthright citizenship has arisen because of the historical, irrational link be-
tween citizenship and birthplace. In her work, she considers the historical
basis for linking citizenship with birthplace and the relevant exclusions.
She advocates for the use of residency to define citizenship and uses the
example of the residency rules to determine citizenship in the 50 states.79
The same principle would presumably apply to countries and support the
notion of open borders. In an Op-Ed in the New York Times, she provoca-
tively presents the challenge: "People should be free to move across bor-
73 Id. at 3.
74 Id. at 6.
75 Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Sovereignty And Uniformity: The Challenges For Equal Citizenship
In The Twenty-First Century, 122 HARV L. REV. 907, 933 (2009).
76 Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 479 (2000),
77 BOSNIAK, supra note 19 at 15.
78 See infra Part III.
79 See Jacqueline Stevens, Citizenship to Go, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/opinion/citizenship-to-go.html.
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ders; they should be citizens of the states where they happen to reside-
period." 80 Stevens' comments are more fully developed in her book,81
States Without Nations: Citizenship for Mortals, in which she includes the
need to abolish birthright citizenship as one of four proposals for changeof
the legal and social status quo. She argues that birthright citizenship as well
as the concept of nation-states supports and promotes numerous inequali-
ties. 82
The most obvious criticism of Stevens' work is that, while the 50 states
cooperate and recognize the free movement of individual within the U.S.
borders, it is unlikely that this recognition will occur as a matter of world
order anytime in the near future. As Seyla Benhabib recognizes, "claims of
sovereign statehood over bounded territories are still the guiding normative
and institutional principles in the international arena." 83 Conceptualizing
citizenship is driven by our domestic concerns, but must also consider how
our definition of citizenship membership fits within the international defini-
tions of rights, duties and obligations of citizenship. As Brubaker puts it,
"We live in a world of nation-states." 84
I suspect that for most Americans, the concept of "citizen aliens" or open
borders would be viewed, as Peter Schuck has suggested, a further devalua-
tion of American citizenship. 85 The relative ease of naturalizing in the
U.S.86 may indicate that for those who choose not to naturalize do not have
a sufficient enough connection with the U.S. to obtain the same or nearly
the same treatment as citizens. Harsh immigration laws may contribute to
the reluctance of some immigrants to seek naturalization. They may fear
detection of a deportable act committed by them or a family member.
However, this concern can be handled by addressing immigration laws and
rights of aliens rather than dispensing with the distinctions between citizens
and aliens.
Stephen Legomsky has developed a formula to aid us in our attempt to
conceptualize citizenship. 87 The ingredients to that formula provide an
80 Id,
81 JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2011).
82 Id. She discusses birthright citizenship, marriage, inheritance, and land rights as her four pro-
posed areas of change.
83 Benhabib, supra note 61, at 440.
84 William R. Brubaker, Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of
Noncitizens, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA,
(William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
85 Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 3
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 1, 13 (1989).
86 Not everyone will agree that even though naturalization is more accessible than in most coun-
tries, neither the process nor the criteria used in the process make it an easy process. See, e.g., Gerald
Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 237 (1994).
87 See Stephen H Legomsky, Why Citizenship, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994).
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analysis that is helpful here-helpful to answer the question as Legomsky
puts it: "What is accomplished by having a citizenship concept at all?" 88
He provides eight categories that are useful in trying to make determina-
tions about the purpose of citizenship: (1) political participation, (2) immi-
gration laws (that limit noncitizens in ways that do not affect citizens), (4)
other rights and disabilities (such as government employment and access to
benefits), 89 (5) symbolism and community, (6) allegiance, (7) sovereignty,
and (8) the world order (international law rationales for citizenship or na-
tionality). Although a thorough examination of these factors cannot be ac-
complished here, I agree with Legomsky that "only after identifying the
reasons for having a citizenship concept can one meaningfully consider
who should receive it."90 Further, I assert that an examination of these rea-
sons will support the conclusion that we should continue to embrace the
concept of citizenship, while assuring that residents have rights and avoid-
ing the problems of differentiated citizenship.
Citizens Without Rights
Equality and citizenship had been explicitly written into the Fourteenth
Amendment... and yet our constitutional law [has]been shaped to ac-
commodate.., legalized subordination. 91
While there are a few instances of differentiated citizenship provided for
in the Constitution, 92 most instances of differentiated citizenship are caused
by the societal borders and barriers that have excluded some citizens from
full membership in the American polity and social life. The constitutional
restrictions are limited, but controversial. The Supreme Court has stated
"that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized per-
son are of the same dignity and are coextensive." 93 However, in Rogers v.
Bellei,94 the Supreme Court stated that statutory citizenship is an expres-
88 Id. at 280.
89 Id at 287-290 (citing DAVID CARLINER, LUCAS GUTTENTAG, ARTHUR HELTON & WADE
HENDERSON, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES-THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO ALIEN AND
REFUGEE RIGHTS (2d ed. 1990) and A. PETER MUTHARIKA, THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW (2
vols. 1980, 1981)).
90 Id. at 285.
91 KARST, supra note 19, at 2.
92 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating the eligibility requirements for the presidency)
and U.S CONST. amend XII ("No person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.").
93 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964).
94 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
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sion of "congressional generosity," 95 suggesting that there is room for some
distinction.96 The distinction that has been the subject of much debate, but
never decided by the Supreme Court is whether the constitutional provision
that only a "natural born" citizen is eligible to be President97 applies to
statutory citizens. The Supreme Court has stated that "naturalized" citizens
are ineligible for the Presidency. 98 Therefore, if statutory citizens are con-
sidered to be naturalized citizens, rather than birth-right citizens, they
would not be eligible for the presidency.99
Kenneth L. Karst's book Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and
the ConstitutionlOO was published over two decades ago but provides an
analysis of differentiated citizenship that remains quite relevant today. Fo-
cusing on the societal barriers to entry into full participation, he discusses
our history to reveal that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee has often been "an abstraction with little substantive content."101
While some scholars have argued that emphasis on citizenship and a
grounding of rights based upon citizenship may support arguments to ex-
clude noncitizens, 102 I believe it is helpful in securing rights for noncitizens
and determining whether there are valid distinctions in rights determina-
tions, to remind ourselves of the ways that those seemingly protected by the
cloak of citizenship have been humiliated and degraded. As Rogers Smith
has suggested, "we must self-consciously confront the tasks of making con-
textual judgments about which kinds of differentiated citizenship [or mem-
bership status] ... are appropriate accommodations.., and which kinds
are divisive and oppressive." 103
An American is an American
95 Id. at 835.
96 For example, it has been suggested that some naturalized citizens have suffered through denatu-
ralization and lost their citizenship because of their political views. See generally, HARRY CARLISLE,
CITIZENS WITHOUT RIGHTS: THE STORY OF How THE WALTER-McCARRAN LAW OF 1952 PENALIZES
FOREIGN-BORN CITIZENS THROUGH "SECOND-CLASS" CITIZENSHIP (1956).
97 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
98 See, e.g., Schneider, 377 U.S. at 165-77.
99 This uncertainty is what has led some to develop a strained interpretation of the Constitution to
claim that President Barack Obama and other presidential candidates are not eligible for the presidency.
See generally Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98
Geo. L.J. 967, 980 (2010) (discussing President Obama and the birther movement); Gabriel J. Chin,
Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months And A Hundred Yards Short of Citi-
zenship, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1 (2008).
100 See generally KARST, supra note 19.
101 Id.
102 See generally Bosniak, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing the privileges or immunities clause of
the Constitution).
103 Smith, supra note 75, at 934.
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Is the process of becoming a citizen the same as becoming an American?
As one commentator notes, "we think of American citizenship as some-
thing that should be ... an essentially uniform status, conferring the same
legal rights and duties on all those who possess it."104 We also like to think
of ourselves as an Immigrant nation with a capital "I", with a diverse mix
of citizens equally participating. But, in our history, it is easy to document
that at the moment of entry into citizenship, a person's citizenship and
rights obtained may be tainted by a label or status assigned to that individu-
al, their family, or even their ancestors. The labels are numerous but can
include a number of small "i" categories: the imported, illegal, illegitimate,
indigenous, illicit, incarcerated, incapacitated, and islanders. Before exam-
ining the rights that arguably should be made available to all people who
reside within our borders, it is worthwhile that we consider that in the U.S.,
disfavored groups have not only been excluded from the acquisition of citi-
zenship, but have often been excluded from sharing equally in the social
and political rights thought to accompany citizenship. Sometimes these dis-
tinctions are made between citizens on the basis of how citizenship is ac-
quired,' 05 but most often differentiated citizenship is based upon an arbi-
trary or discriminatory assignment of status.
In trying to determine which rights are important and which should be
deemed available to all residents or reserved only for citizens, it is helpful
to reflect upon how various groups have been excluded over time and the
justifications for these exclusions. Judith N. Shklar, in her book, American
Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion suggests that this undertaking include
an investigation of "what citizenship has meant to those women and men
who have been denied all or some of its attributes, and who ardently want-
ed to be full citizens." 106
What are all of the attributes of citizenship? What are the civil, political,
and social rights and entitlements that citizens should expect? Walzer ar-
gues that there are three categories of citizens based upon their willingness
and ability to fully participate in the political community: the oppressed cit-
izen, the alienated citizen and the pluralist citizen.107 Starting from early in
our history, the right to "speak, print, worship, enter into contracts, hold
personal property in their own name, sue and be sued, and exercise sundry
other civil rights," have been described as civil rights held by alien men
and single white women during the nineteenth century, while voting, hold-
104 Id. at 1.
105 See text accompanying notes 92-101, supra.
106 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 15 (1991).
107 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 203, 226-228.
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ing public office and serving on juries was reserved to white male citi-
zens. 108 Ayelet Shachar includes in the "membership goods" legal status,
rights, identity, security, political voice, and the practiced experience of
membership in the political community.109 Walzer also includes the right
to receive protection from the state. 10 As he puts it, "[t]he citizen can be
regarded first and most simply as the recipient of certain benefits [including
liberty and protection] that the state, and no other social or political organi-
zation, provides." Smith further emphasizes these reasons for belonging:
"Most people wish to believe that they belong to communities that can pro-
vide for their physical security and promote their economic prosperity
while giving them a share of political power, and they also want to believe
that those community memberships have ethical worth." I I1
Below I discuss how various groups have denied these membership
goods. While the discussion here is necessarily done in a summary fashion,
it is not meant to minimize the rights denials suffered by many marginal-
ized groups.
The Imported
The dream ofAmerica as the great melting pot has not been realized for
the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot. 112
As the Supreme Court has stated, black slaves were "imported" into the
country."l 3 They were classified as goods and in many ways had just as
many rights as other goods; goods that were classified as property and be-
longed to citizens. The imported, the descendants of the imported, and
those having physical similarities to the imported, even if they entered as
free persons, were subjected to what can be considered the most dehuman-
izing and degrading exclusions from citizenship and accompanying rights.
Thus, I have selected as my prime example of exclusion, slaves and their
descendants, but also discuss below other horrendous examples of exclu-
108 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 48 (1998) (dis-
cussing rights historically held by all citizens and rights held by "first-class" citizens).
109 Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship And The Global Race For Talent, 120
YALE L.J. 2088, 2105-2106 (2011).
110 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 205-206.
111 Smith, supra note 75, at 932.
112 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400-01 (1978) (Marshall, J.)
113 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 271 (1901); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393 ; Smith v.
Turner, 48 U.S. 283, (1849) (citing 3 Ell. Deb., 1st ed., p. 98.) ("The Eastern States, who long ago have
abolished slavery, did not approve of the expression slaves. They therefore used another, which an-
swered the same purpose ... The word migration refers to free persons, but the word importation refers
to slaves, because free persons cannot be said to be imported"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I (providing
that "the Migration and Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper
to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to Year one thousand eight hundred and eight").
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sion. As one commentator has noted, "our nation has an unsettling history
of uneasy intercultural relations; slavery and segregation of blacks is the
most invidious but by no means the only example of our darker side." 114
While most Americans agree that the period of our country when the ac-
ceptance of slavery in our country and the mistreatment of slaves was
commonplace, is a shameful time that continues to have implications for
our present. However, there are many who fail to see that after slavery end-
ed, the descendants of those imported individuals were subjected to inter-
generational denial of rights even after citizenship was extended to them.
Many legal and societal barriers have perpetuated their exclusion in many
areas of social and political life. One of the most glaring exclusions in our
history has been in the area of education as I have discussed elsewhere. 15
Shklar, in her book on exclusions,11 6 focuses mainly on the plight of
black Americans and their movement from slavery to second-class citizen-
ship. As she puts it, "[t]o be less than a full citizen is at the very least to ap-
proach the dreaded condition of a slave. To be a second-class citizen is to
suffer derogation and the loss of respectable standing.""l 7 Her exploration
of this status is accomplished by examining two rights presumed incident to
citizenship status: the right to earn and the right to vote.' 1 8
Dred Scott, a former slave was denied access to federal court diversity
jurisdiction because the Supreme Court held that he was not a citizen of the
United States. 1 19 Further the Court noted that even if he was a free black
man, he was not entitled to rights that even non-citizens held.120 The con-
sequence of the Dred Scott decision is referred to by Henry Chambers and
others as black persons being excluded from the first tier of "tiered citizen-
ship"121 which was reserved for white males. 122 In fact, early in our histo-
ry, black people were placed in the lowest category of "tiered person-
114 Patricia Wald, "One Nation Indivisible, With Liberty And Justice For All": Lessons From The
American Experience For New Democracies," 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 283, 285 (1990).
115 See generally Anna Williams Shavers, Katrina's Children: Revealing the Broken Promise of
Education, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 499, 499 (2006).
116 SHKLAR, supra note 106.
117 Id. at 17.
118 Others have noted that the right to vote without participation in politics does not accomplish
full citizenship. See, e.g., OBLIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 210 (stating "If the citizen is a passive figure,
there is no political community. [T]here is a political community in which many citizens live like al-
iens"); Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues of the
Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1905, 1918 (1993).
119 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393 (diversity jurisdiction required a dispute between citizens of differ-
ent states and Dred Scott was not a citizen).
120 See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood,
82 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 209, 211 (2007) (discussing Chief Justice Taney's opinion and noting that while
Indians could become citizens, black persons could not).
121 Id.
122 White women were relegated to second-tier status. See id at 215.
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hood."123 Blacks were considered inferior to everyone else. Women were
second-class citizens while blacks could not be citizens and other non-
citizens were persons who could become citizens. 124 When slavery was
abolished125 and former slaves were made citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination
in voting, first-class citizenship appeared to be extended to blacks. Howev-
er, legal and social institutions made it clear that whatever had been ex-
tended to blacks, it was not first-class citizenship. Some evidence comes
from laws not directly aimed at blacks, but nevertheless emphasized their
second-class status. For example, in 1892, Congress passed the Chinese
Deportation Act126 which required resident Chinese laborers to obtain a
certificate of residence. If a person had not obtained a certificate, they
could avoid deportation by (1) establishing in court that they had good rea-
son for not obtaining the certificate and (2) by testimony of one credible
white witness. 127 This law provided a dual layer of discrimination-
discrimination against Chinese and blacks and illustrates that "[Racism] is
a part of our common historical experience and... a part of our cul-
ture."128
By the time that Plessy v. Ferguson129 was decided, upholding a state
statute that required separate railway coaches for blacks, it was clear that
blacks had been moved from the lowest category of tiered personhood to
the lowest category of tiered citizenship. Even after decisions like Brown v.
Board of Educationl30 and the enactment of civil rights laws,131 there are
many indicators that blacks are still not full participant citizens. Joblessness
and underemployment continue to plague the black population.132 African
Americans are incarcerated at grossly disproportionate rates throughout the
123 Id. at 218.
124 Id. (discussing Taney's reasoning in Dred Scott).
125 Although there are arguably other dates that apply, I refer here to 1865 when the Thirteenth
Amendment was approved.
126 Chinese Deportation Act of May 6, 1892, 27 Stat. 25, c. 60.
127 See Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See also J. Allen Douglas, The "Priceless
Possession" of Citizenship: Race, Nation and Naturalization in American Law, 1880-1930, 43 Duq. L.
Rev. 369, 399 n. 70 (2005) (discussing how Chinese fit within the tiered system of entitlement).
128 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 4
(1989) (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987)).
129 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For an excellent discussion of the struggles of black persons seeking to
obtain equal treatment in public transportation, see KELLEY BLAIR L. M, RIGHT TO RIDE: STREETCAR
BOYCOTTS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE ERA OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON (2010).
130 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregated public schools are unconstitutional).
131 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, including employment).
132 See generally 2012 State of Black America available at
http://www.iamempowered.com/soba / 2012/read/sobaonlinereader.
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United States.133 The high rate of incarceration along with felon disenfran-
chisement134 further decreases participation of African Americans in the
political community.
Other "i" Groups
Here, I briefly recall some of the exclusionary practices that have affect-
ed other groups based upon their status or assigned identities. These groups
like African Americans may continue to experience exclusion based upon
their historical barriers.
Incapacitated: Women in many ways have been classified as lacking ca-
pacity, unfit for roles in the political, business and social community. Since
the beginning of the feminist movement in the United States during the
middle of the nineteenth century, many have attempted to eradicate laws
that presented a disadvantage to women merely because of their sex and
excluded them from pull participation in rights of citizenship. There was a
time when a married woman could have no property of her own and, there-
fore, a wife could not enter a contract without her husband's signature, 135
women were excluded from service on juries, 136 and a man who engaged in
conduct that would generally subject him to a charge of assault and battery
was not prosecuted when the acts were committed by a husband against a
wife. 137 In Minor v. Happersett,138 the Court held that a native born citizen
of the United States and of the State of Missouri, who was free, white, and
twenty-one, was not allowed to vote because her state limited voting to
male citizens. The Court reasoned that the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include rights of suffrage. In
133 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 97 (2012).
134 See id. at 153; Chambers, supra note 120, at 225 (stating the justification that felon disfran-
chisement may be facially constitutional does not actually justify the practice); Gabriel J. Chin, Recon-
struction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004) (discussing Mississippi's choice of
crimes to which felon disfranchisement would apply based on beliefs regarding the characteristics of
crimes that black people would commit).
135 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337 (1885) (holding that a deed signed without hus-
band's signature was invalid and that the husband's signature was needed to give wife his protection).
The traditional philosophy of William Blackstone was incorporated into American law, ultimately limit-
ing the rights of married women. Blackstone considered that "the husband and the wife are one person
in law; that is the very being or legal existence of the women is suspended during the marriage, or at
least, is incorporated.., into that of the husband..." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 430 (Clarendon Press 1765-1769). See also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 499 (W. Grp. Publ'g, 2d ed., 1987).
136 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
137 See Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905).
138 Happersett, 88 U.S. 162.
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Bradwell v. Illinois,139 decided in 1872, the Supreme Court held that the
privileges and immunity clause did not require that women be admitted to
the Illinois bar.140 In Muller v. Oregon, 141 the Court upheld discriminatory
economic legislation in part because states had a valid interest in protecting
women because of their maternal role. The first major change was the
granting of the vote to women in 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment
was ratified.142 Rules for acquisition as well as loss of citizenship reflected
gender bias. From 1790 when the first naturalization act was passed by
Congress,143 until 1934,144 children became citizens when their fathers
were naturalized, but not upon the naturalization of their mothers. The idea
that a married woman merged into her husband to create only one identity
was even incorporated into citizenship law so that a woman lost her Ameri-
can citizenship when she married a foreigner.145 One of the first women
admitted to practice law lost both her license to practice law and her citi-
zenship because of her marriage to a Dutch citizen.146
Indigenous: In some ways, Indians can be referred to as the First Citi-
zens of our country, but the Elk decision is evidence that the Fourteenth
Amendment is interpreted as "a constitutional testimony of the separate sta-
tus of Indian[s]."' 147 The Elk decision echoed the views of some1 48 but was
denounced by others because it placed Indians in a separate status. 149 Indi-
139 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
140 See also In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1876) (Wisconsin denial of bar admission to Lavinia
Goodell); In re Belva A. Lockwood (U.S. Ct. of Cl. 1874), reprinted in 21 CENTRAL L. J. 253 (1874).
For a discussion of the efforts of Myra Bradwell and early admissions of other women to the practice of
law, see KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO
THE PRESENT 1438 (1986).
141 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
142 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
143 Uniform Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (1790) (repealed 1795).
144 Although the naturalization laws had been amended to provide that minor children acquired
citizenship upon the naturalization of "the parent" (see, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, §5, 34 Stat.
1228, 1229), most courts construed parent to mean father unless the father was deceased (see, e.g., In re
Citizenship Status of Minor Children Where Mother Alone Becomes Citizen Through Naturalization,
25 F.2d 210 (D. N.J. 1928)). The Act was amended in 1934 to change the word "parent" to "father or
mother". Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, §2, 48 Stat. 797.
145 The Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, §3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228-29, provided that any American
woman who married a foreigner "shall take the nationality of her husband [for so long as the marriage
lasted]."
146 See American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing Before A S. Subcomm. on Immigration,
72nd Cong. 26 (1933); Relative to Citizenship of American Women Married to Foreigners: Hearings
Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 65th Cong. 13-14 (1918); Robert Ferrari, The
Status of a Woman Lawyer Who Marries an Alien, 4 WOMEN L.J. 84 (1914).
147 Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 195, 239 (1984).
148 See generally George F. Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 AM. L. REv. 21 (188 1)
(expressing the view that Indians were not ready for citizenship).
149 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 122-23 (1884) (Harlan voicing his dissatisfaction with the majori-
ty's treatment of John Elk.) (Harlan & Woods, J.J., dissenting).
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ans suffered forcible removal from their land and arrest for leaving Indian
Territory.150 Indian families were torn apart in the off reservation place-
ments plan which were designed to implement governmental policies of
"terminating" Indian tribes and assimilating Indian children to the Euro-
American value of possessive individualism. 151 As David Wilkins notes,
"while the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution accorded African Americans a measure of legal recognition of
their humanity and constitutional personhood, it was not until a federal
court decision in 1879 that the law began to constitutionally recognize In-
dians as 'persons."'1 52 In Standing Bear v. Crook,153 the government's ar-
gument that the Indian was neither a person nor a citizen under the Consti-
tution was ultimately rejected. Indians continue to pursue complete
recognition of their rights, which includes the enactment of legislation to
implement the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples.1 54 The
Native People of Hawaii have also attempted to obtain legislation recogniz-
ing their rights.155
Islanders: The "islanders" label refers to the fact that U.S. law provides
for differentiated citizenship for some groups who have acquired citizen-
ship through collective naturalization. While collective naturalization prin-
ciples were applied to states as they joined the union and their eligible resi-
dents were collectively naturalized as U.S. citizens, acquiring the
accompanying rights and obligations, when collective naturalizations were
applied to residents of acquired island territories, 156 these residents were
assigned a form of complex and confusing second-class citizenship. For
example, as some commentators have noted, Puerto Ricans "are, indeed,
U.S. citizens. The problem is, of course, that even though they're citizens,
they do not have the rights with which citizenship is associated; they're, in
150 See id.
151 Pauline Turner Strong, What is an Indian Family? The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Re-
nascence of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 AM. STUDS., 205-231 (Fall-Winter 2005).
152 David E Wilkins, African Americans and Aboriginal Peoples: Similarities and Differences in
Historical Experiences, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 515 (2005).
153 United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700 (1879) (declaring that "an
Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and, has, therefore the right to
sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court").
154 See, e.g., Native Americans Urges Government to Stop Marginalization, Congressional Hear-
ing, GALDU.ORG, http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?odas=5287&giellal=eng.
155 See, e.g., Amy Ridenour, Native Hawaiian Act: E Pluribus Unum No Longer?
NATIONALCENTER.ORG (May 28, 2006), http://www.nationalcenter.org/2006/05/native-hawaiian-act-e-
pluribus-unum-no.html.
156 For thorough discussions of the broader constitutional law issues, see IVAN MUSICANT,
EMPIRE BY DEFAULT: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE DAWN OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY
(1998) (discussing the United States expansion in Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Pan-
ama Canal, and Guantanamo Bay); Juan R Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Re-
gime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. OF PA. J. INT'L L. 283 (2007-2009).
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some sense, second-hand citizens. This raises interesting questions about
what "citizenship" really amounts to." 157
Some residents are classified as citizens and others as nationals. Resi-
dents born and living in the territories of Guam,158 the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands,159 the U.S. Virgin Islands160 and Puerto Ri-
co161 are U.S. citizens, but they cannot vote in presidential elections.1 62
Their congressional representative also cannot vote in Congress. As a re-
cently filed lawsuit illustrates, the residents were assigned various treat-
ments of their citizenship status.163 The plaintiffs in the lawsuit include in-
dividuals who allege that by being classified as nationals164 they have been
denied recognition as U.S. citizens while residing in the U.S. and serving in
the military because they were born in American Samoa and consequently
were the denied rights of a citizen, including the right to vote in federal and
state elections. Those born in American Samoa are considered nationals,
who also do not pay federal income taxes and cannot vote for president.
They also have a nonvoting delegate in Congress. Nationals must follow
the same procedures for naturalization as those who are permanent legal
residents. In a recent decision denying a Puerto Rican citizen the right to
vote in U.S. presidential elections, Judge Torruella of the First Circuit re-
minded us of earlier criticisms that the U.S. had racially discriminatory rea-
sons for not granting full citizenship to island residents. He stated:
Although the unequal treatment of persons because of the color of their
skin or other irrelevant reasons was then the modus operandi of govern-
ments, and an accepted practice of societies in general, the continued en-
forcement of these rules by the courts is today an outdated anachronism, to
say the least.165
While some residents of the territories want the Fourteenth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions to apply fully to their residents so that
they are "constitutional citizens" rather than "statutory citizens," not all res-
157 Joel Col6n-Rios and Martin Hevia, The Legal Status of Puerto Rico and the Institutional Re-
quirements of Republicanism, 17 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 25 (2011).
158 Immigration and Nationality Act §307, 8 U.S.C. 1407 (2012).
159 See Presidential Proclamation No. 5564, November 3, 1986, 51 FR 40399, 3 CFR, 1986
Comp., p. 146
160 Immigration and Nationality Act §306, 8 U.S.C. 1406 (2012).
161 Immigration and Nationality Act §302, 8 U.S.C. 1402 (2012).
162 See Igartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, de la Rosa v.
U.S., 547 U.S. 1035 (U.S. Mar 20, 2006) (NO. 05-650) (lawsuit by a Puerto Rican citizen of the United
States dismissed, denying his claim that as a citizen he enjoys the right to vote in presidential elections
under the ICCPR and customary international law).
163 Tuaua v. United States, CIV. 12-01143 RJL, 2013 WL 3214961 (D. D.C. June 26, 2013)
164 Immigration and Nationality Act §308, 8 U.S.C. 1408 (2012) (nationals but not citizens).
165 Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 613 (1st Cir. 2010) (J. Torruella concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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idents agree that these steps should be taken. 166
There are of course other groups that could be included in this examina-
tion and other outrageous examples of interferences with the rights of citi-
zens based upon their membership in an assigned status. These include the
disenfranchisement of the incarcerated, the classification of children born
out of wedlock as illegitimate, the internment of Japanese Americans with-
out due process during World War II and the forcible return to Mexico of
U.S. citizens during "Operation Wetback."' 167
Noncitizens Rights
If rights are defined as an attribute of citizenship, what then of those who
lack citizenship by legal definition?168
The placement of this discussion gave me pause. In many ways the is-
sues discussed here affect the foreign born who are citizens as well as citi-
zens who have family members who are noncitizens. Immigrants, whether
legally admitted or not are denied many of the political and social benefits
that attach to citizenship. Both citizens and noncitizens can be affected by
these distinctions.
An important consideration in the determination of rights and who
should receive these rights is whether immigrant status should make a dif-
ference or is this a basis for differentiation that results in oppressive and di-
visive measures?' 69 Is it enough to provide a liberal method of access to
citizenship to obtain full participation in the political and social communi-
ty? Should this access to rights be tied to residency rather than citizenship?
Should immigrants be viewed as suffering the same types of unjust exclu-
sions that citizen groups have suffered? These are difficult questions even
for many liberal thinkers to tackle. As Linda Bosniak notes, "[a]lienage
166 See, e.g., Fili Sagapolutele, Am. Samoans Suing For U.S. Citizenship Told To Consult Com-
munity, PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT, http://pidp.org/pireport/2012/July/07-25-1 0.htm.
167 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217, 219 (1944) (upholding the racially-based
curfew and the internment regulations); Regina Austin, "The Shame of it All" Stigma and the Disen-
franchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 173
(2004); Camille M. Davidson, Mother's Baby, father's Maybel--Intestate Succession: When Should a
Child Born Out of Wedlock Have a Right to Inherit from or Through His or Her Biological Father?, 22
Colum. J. Gender & L. 531 (2011); Juan Ram6n Garcia, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of
Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954, The Border: Operation Wetback (1980), available at
http://www.pbs.org/kpbs/theborder/historytimeline20.htm; see also Fred L. Koestler, Handbook of Tex-
as Online: Operation Wetback, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pqo0l.
168 BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 78.
169 See supra text accompanying note 109.
2014]
526 JOURNAL OF CI1VIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3
presents real difficulties for antisubordination theorists."1 70
The abrogation of noncitizen rights has occurred because of a number of
factors. Most recently these have included fears driven by the 1993 terrorist
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the tragedy of
September 11, 2001. Both of these tragedies led to amendments to the Im-
migration and Nationality Act in 1996 and the enactment of the USA Patri-
ot Act in 2001, respectively.171 In addition, numerous immigration regula-
tory changes were made. 172 Other fears have been based upon changes in
the demographics of the country. These fears have generated numerous at-
tempts by state and local governments to place restrictions on education,
housing, and employment designed to make life more difficult for undocu-
mented immigrants.173 In addition, federal legislation yenacted in 1996,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA)174 made comprehensive changes to noncitizen eligibility
for public benefits. 175
The exclusion of rights for noncitizens led to actions such as the Immi-
grant Freedom Rides in the United States in 2003 and recent campaigns to
obtain local voting rights for some noncitizen immigrants.176 The argu-
ment for voting rights, at least with respect to resident aliens, is based upon
the idea that the noncitizens should have a vote because they are regulated
170 BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 11.
171 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (establishing some of the
most onerous immigration provisions that have ever been enacted).; Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107- 56, §§411-412, 115 Stat. 272, 345-52. Other recent legislation included Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49
U.S.C.); the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.); and the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
172 See generally, Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security
After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1369 (2007).
173 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (striking down most of Arizona's
controversial Immigration Enforcement Law, SB 1070, but upholding the portion of the law that re-
quires law enforcement officers to determine immigration status during a lawful stop); see also Nat'l
Conference of State Legislators, 2012 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE
STATES (JAN. 1 - JUNE 30, 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2012-
immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions.aspx (monitoring state immigration related legislation and
maintains a website with descriptions of and numbers of proposed and enacted legislation).
174 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
175 See Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-immigrant Provisions
of the "Contract with America " Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1048-49, 1053 (2002) (providing thorough
analysis of the effects of PRWORA).
176 See BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 9; See also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEAT-SHOPS: THE
FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 301 (2005); see generally, Steven Greenhouse, Riding Across America
for Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at A20; Robert F. Worth, Push Is On to Give Legal
Immigrants a Vote in the City, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2004, at 1.
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by the government. The principle is that anyone who is directly affected by
government policy should have a say in it. 177
Many scholars have documented the many ways in which both immigra-
tion and generally applicable laws and policies distinguish between citizens
and noncitizens in determining the extension of rights. Jennifer Chac6n el-
oquently demonstrates the link between the underlying facts in the Dred
Scott case which involved the brutal separation of family members and the
current immigration laws which often result in the separation of family
members through the deportation process.178 Kevin Johnson has described
the public and governmental response to the plight of immigrants in the af-
termath of Hurricane Katrina and the general implications of treating im-
migrants "[a]s less than full-fledged members of U.S. society. . . often
considered nothing more than 'aliens' in our midst... deemed unworthy of
sympathy, public relief, and general concern." 179 The implications of the
increasing numbers of noncitizens of color and the participation of nonciti-
zens in social and political life is explored by Enid Trucios-Haynes.180 Re-
latedly, David Brooks notes in a recent article entitled "Relax We'll be Fi-
ne" that increased diversity is inevitable (due to continued migration and
differential fertility rates), and should be considered a source of national
strength rather than a source of fear or uneasiness that some express. 181 The
lasting effect of the plenary power doctrine in immigration which was
based on racially discriminatory policies, especially with regard to
Asians,182 has been examined by Gabriel Chin.183 He includes in his analy-
sis the parallels between the African-American and Asian American legal
177 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 419-22 (restricting right to vote on the basis of race); Happersett, 88
U.S. at 178 (restricting right to vote on the basis of gender); see also Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1093-1100 (1977); SEYLA
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 1-7 (2004) (arguing a more
inclusive approach to political membership).
178 Jennifer M. Chacon, Citizenship and Family: Revisiting Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y
45, 51 (2008).
179 Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons about Immigrants in the Administrative State,
45 HOUS. L. REV. I1, 14-15. (2008-2009). See also BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 4-5, 9-11, 15 (2006)
(analyzing the ambiguous status of immigrants in U.S. society).
180 Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Legacy of Racially Restrictive Immigration Laws and Policies and
the Construction of the American National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369 (1997).
181 David Brooks, Op-Ed, Relax Well Be Fine, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/opinion/06brooks.html.
182 See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943);
the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, which restricted immigration from Japan; the California Alien
Land Law of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat., c. 113, which restricted land ownership by "aliens ineligible to citi-
zenship." See also Ozawa v. United States (1922) and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923),
which held that a Japanese man and a Punjabi man were determined ineligible for citizenship because
they were not white; and the national origin quota set by the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (re-
pealed 1952).
183 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Consti-
tutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1.
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experience. In his book No Undocumented Child Left Behind184, Michael
Olivas discusses the Plyler v. Doe decision 85 generally with respect to the
effect it has had on rights for noncitizens. More specifically, he builds a
case in support of the DREAM Act,186 which seeks to expand the reasoning
in Plyler to the plight that many undocumented children face when they
graduate from high school.
There are some examples of actions taken to include immigrants in the
political and social life of America. Most notable here are those aimed at
providing avenues for undocumented to remain in the U.S. The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act provides that a person documented or undocu-
mented who has "served honorably" during wartime may be naturalized
through an expedited naturalization process.187 During peace time, immi-
grants can also apply for naturalization through military service without
having to meet the residency requirements imposed upon most individuals
seeking to naturalize.1 88 On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced
that young undocumented immigrants who were came to the U.S. before
age 16, upon meeting other specified criteria, would not be subjected to de-
portation and would be eligible for a work permit.189 This is a temporary
measure until the DREAM Act can be passed. Even with these optimistic
measures, there is a need to develop guiding principles to determine and
provide rights to noncitizens.
Hiroshi Motomura in his book, "Americans in Waiting", suggests that
those seeking permanent immigration should be viewed as in a "transition
to citizenship."190 During this limited transition period, grounds for depor-
184 MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012).
185 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (struck down a Texas statute that withheld from local school
districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United
States and did not pay tuition). For a discussion of the facts involved and the Court's analysis, see Mi-
chael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, The Education of Undocumented Children, and the Polity, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 197, 199-210 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
186 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act) is bipartisan legisla-
tion that has been introduced in Congress but not passed. Under certain conditions undocumented
young people would be eligible for a conditional path to citizenship. See Olivas, supra note 184, at
Chapter 4.
187 See Immigration and Nationality Act §329, 8 U.S. C. § 1440 (2013); Exec. Order No. 13269,
67 Fed. Reg. 45287, no. 130, July 8, 2002.
188 Immigration and Nationality Act §328, 8 U.S. C. § 1439.
189 See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, available at DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb ld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d a/?vgnextoid=f2e
f2fl 9470f731 oVgVCM 100000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f2ef2f1 9470f731 0VgnVCM 1000000
82ca6OaRCRD (last updated Jan. 18, 2013), for frequently asked questions and general description of
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.
190 See generally, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2007) (examining how and why a transition to
citizenship view of immigrants should work in society today).
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tation would be restricted and immigrants would be eligible for many of the
same benefits that citizens receive, including eligibility to vote in at least
local elections. 191 The transition period would end after a specified time pe-
riod and the immigrant would lose all or some of the privileges granted.
Henry Chambers suggests a model for justifying a restriction of rights. It
consists of two-steps: "The first step requires determining why the right at
issue exists [and] [t]he second step requires comparing the basis for the re-
striction to the purpose of the right restricted." He suggests that "[i]f there
is little or no relationship between the right's utilization and the restriction
of the right, the restriction may be an exercise of the raw power to restrict
rights rather than a justification for the restriction of the right." 192 The dis-
tinction of rights extended on the basis of residency rather than citizenship
could be developed by combining the Chambers model with Legomsky's
suggested analysis. Legomsky suggests for example that we might want to
place rights that have a particularly compelling need such as police or fire
protection in the category that would be extended on the basis of residen-
cy. 193
International Law and the Rights of Noncitizens
"One essential component of most contemporary conceptions of demo-
cratic justice is the protection of basic human rights such as freedom of re-
ligion, freedom of thought and expression, equal treatment under the
law. .. "194
Perhaps we can be assisted in the task of line drawing by referring to in-
ternational law principles.195 As Peter Spiro has suggested, this "is not to
say that international law now delivers a comprehensive regulatory regime.
States will retain important discretionary powers into the future. But no
function of governance will be shielded from international law as a categor-
ical matter, membership decisions included." 196 Some issues regarding the
191 Id. at 189-200.
192 Chambers, supra note 120, at 224.
193 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 290 (1994). See also supra
text accompanying notes 87-90.
194 Carens, supra note 3, at 28.
195 See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS (2008). See also
BOSNIAK, supra note 19, at 25 ("[S]tandards, which encompass civil, social, and sometimes cultural
rights, represent an alternative source of rights that transcends the jurisdiction of individual nation-
states.").
196 See Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 746
(2011).
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division between political and civil rights and who has access to these
rights are addressed in international law principles and treaties, but these
sources also fail to provide definitive answers. Nonetheless, an examination
of international law may provide a basis to challenge immigration law and
practices aimed at noncitizens that exclude them from access and protec-
tions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),197 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),198 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 99are
known as the "International Bill of Rights." One international scholar aptly
describes their significance: The ICCPR and the ICESCR, which came into
force in 1976, "were drafted to transform the principles of basic human
rights originally formulated by the [UDHR] into binding rules of law that
all states are obliged to follow." 200 The United States ratified the ICCPR in
1992 but made several reservations.2 0IThe United States has not yet ratified
the ICESCR nor has it ratified or signed the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families that provides specific human rights protections for
grants.2 021n particular, the ICCPR recognizes the right to enjoy "civil and
political freedom" and extends these rights to all people within a country
with few exceptions. 203 The only specific references to rights that are lim-
ited to "citizens" relate to the political community and are found in Article
25:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs...
197 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111) (Dec.
10, 1948).
198 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doe. A/6316 at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. See also Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 59 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, available at http://
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b4ccprpI.htm.
199 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterestPages/CESCR.aspx [hereinafter ICESCR] (including 153
signatories).
200 See Shaleeta Washington, Transcending Rhetoric: Redressing Discrimination In Education In
Bulgaria andIsrael Through Affirmative Action, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 969, 977 (2005).
201 See Senate Report on Ratification of The International Covenant on Civil and Politcal Rights,
S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23 at 7-11 (1992).
202 See Feminist Majority Foundation Fact Sheet, United States Failure to Ratify Key International
Conventions, Treaties and Laws, available at http://www.feministcampus.org/fmla/printable-
materials/global_project/ratify_ factsheet.pdf.
203 See ICCPR, pmbl. & Arts. 3, 4.
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(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ... guaran-
teeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.204
On the other hand, some other sections permit discrimination based on
citizenship and immigration status. In Article 2, for example, the prohibited
categories for distinctions in the provision of rights includes "race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status" but does not include nationality as a prohib-
ited ground. 205 Similarly, Article 12 does not specifically mention citizen-
ship or nationality, but it does provide that the right to freely move within a
nation-state is limited to those "lawfully within the territory of a State" and
that the prohibition against an arbitrary deprivation of a right to enter a
country is limited to an individual's "own country." 20 6An alien's right to a
hearing to contest expulsion from a nation-state is limited by Article 13 to
"an alien lawfully in the territory." 207 Even when rights are found to exist,
the nation-state can deny certain rights in times of "public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation." 208
Conclusion
In many ways, my comments here and those of others that I have cited
provide more questions than answers. They do, however sound as a re-
minder of our past and the ways in which some exclusions from political
and social life harm our country. While, it may be important to reserve
some privileges to those who have made a commitment to the country as a
citizen or permanent resident. We should strive to make determinations
about access to rights on grounds that are not based upon arbitrary factors.
204 Id. at Art. 25.
205 Id. at Art. 2(1). While it might be argued that national and social origin encompasses nationali-
ty, international treaties usually list both categories if nationality is also a protected class. See, e.g., In-
ternational Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, arts. l(1), (7), U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990), available at
http:// www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm.
206 ICCPR, at Art. 12(4). The Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28 of the
ICCPR, has issued an ICCPR General Comment that allows for each country to restrict the movements
of persons who are not lawfully within the territory and such lawful status is determined by domestic
law. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement, 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. l/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139c394.html.
207 ICCPR, at Art. 13.
208 Id. at Art. 4(1). See also Bosniak, supra note 76, at 25 (noting that international human rights
"standards, which encompass civil, social, and sometimes cultural rights, represent an alternative source
of rights that transcends the jurisdiction of individual nation-states").
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